

From Beliefs to Arguments: Interpretive Methodology and Rhetorical Political Analysis

Alan Finlayson

This article examines the development of methods of political analysis concerned with ideas, beliefs and meanings and argues that these need to be supplemented by an approach attuned to the specific nature of political action. It argues that since politics involves the contest of ideas, beliefs and meanings, analysis should focus on arguments. Considering methods for the study of political arguments the article argues for a re-examination of the rhetorical tradition and the development of a Rhetorical Political Analysis (RPA). It then outlines the sorts of things this would examine, the questions it would ask and the ways in which it might go about answering them.

Keywords: rhetoric; interpretivism; methodology; political analysis; metaphor

Introduction

It is increasingly accepted that contemporary politics involves a complex and de-centred system, the interaction of multiple agents and agencies in ways that may be hierarchical but are also participatory (Rhodes 1997; Stoker 1998; Pierre 2000; Mayntz 2003). Political rule may thus involve not direct subjugation to an authority-on-high but incorporation taking place across 'traditional' boundaries (public and private, expert and layperson, leader and led) and built on a common information base, shared understandings and agreed ways of examining issues. Since, initially at least, agents may not share information and understanding, and have interests that are not immediately commensurable, the politics of network governance must therefore concern, in some measure, the forging of relationships between agents and the bringing about of a convergence of interests. In this context political authority can be 'considered a distinct type of communicative relationship for articulating binding decisions and actions for a given field, terrain or group of people' (Bang 2003, 9; see also Easton 1953). Networks are animated, defined even, by the flows of communication and information that make them possible and that invite or exclude participants. But the way in which communication in governance networks takes place and is managed is a neglected and under-theorised area of research (see Bang 2003, 8–23). This article makes the case for the analysis of just such communications through understanding them as rhetoric: as persuasive communications made in contingent and conflictual civic contexts.

The article argues, firstly, that rational choice theories possess too narrow a concept of reasoning. A broader understanding of how decisions are taken is needed. But institutionalist positions, that place rational choices into more social contexts,



drawing attention to 'ideational' factors, lack a clear concept of 'ideas' and may simply displace rational decisions from individuals to forms of collectivity. What is required is a way of interpreting the processes of reasoning that lie behind decisions. The article then looks closely at the interpretive political analysis recently proposed by Mark Bevir and Rod Rhodes (2003 and 2006). It is argued that their work moves decisively in the right direction but should be supplemented by a fuller appreciation of the strategic and collective nature of political decision-making, that we need to examine not ideas but arguments and that to analyse political persuasion and preference transformation we must reacquaint ourselves with the rhetorical tradition. The latter half of the article outlines the areas of inquiry, and the questions posed, by a putative 'Rhetorical Political Analysis' (RPA) and concludes with a call for the development of research in this area and for understanding of the intersubjective persuasive processes of politics.

From Rational Choice to the Ideational

Contemporary political analysis is dominated by rational choice theories (Marsh and Sevigny 2004), by research that seeks methodological parsimony and replication. The presumptions that social actions are straightforwardly instrumental, that preferences can be treated as fixed and that they belong to or derive from individual actors, facilitate these ends but also encourage a 'hyper-determinism' in which political action is understood as a simple expression of the dynamics of interests narrowly conceived and with no significant intervening process: interests just manifest themselves as unmediated action-in-the-world (Hindess 1988; Barker 2000; Hay 2002, 103–104). Political phenomena can then be conceived as outputs of numerous individual social actions, and institutions understood as bargaining arenas for individuals or collectives concerned with optimisation: agents whose moral, philosophical, ideological or other motivations are of minimal significance.

When Weber argued that actions were the basic unit of social science analysis, and that their explanation should be based on the meanings and intentions of actors, he did not limit rational decision-making to the category of instrumental calculation but also specified affective, traditional and valuational rationalities, a broad-based conception enabling one to understand decision-making as a process that must include at least some element of deliberation (Hindess 1988), even argumentation with others or oneself (Billig 1987) in which there are numerous grounds for acting and various criteria of choice that may be considered, accepted or rejected. As a parsimonious method for analysing decisions taken in confined contexts with clearly defined rules, rational choice theory (RCT) is not without merit. But because it makes use of an impoverished notion of reason it is limited and cannot fully explain all social actions (Boudon 1998). Preferences, as James March and Johan Olsen (1984, 739) argued, may develop in numerous ways and political action transform them. 'Choice' is an intersubjective process involving historically-shaped values and habits of thought as well as emotionally and instrumentally generated criteria. Political analysis has therefore to investigate dynamic processes of preference formation derived from multiple forms of rationality.

'New' institutionalism has broadened the contexts within which political actions are understood, emphasising the background effects of institutionalised values and

traditions (Lowndes 2002). This has in turn precipitated an 'ideational turn' but with a tendency merely to supplement RCT approaches rather than question their basic assumptions (Blyth 1997 and 2002; Fischer 2003, 22). Part of the problem here is equivocation about what 'ideas' are. A range of terms often used interchangeably and seemingly imagined to be synonymous are norm, belief, paradigm, value, habit, tradition, narrative and even culture. To this equivocation is added a tendency to acknowledge the ideational only so as to displace it on to something else: the instrumental action of self-interested politicians (e.g. Krasner 1993); the superior structural location of the actor who promotes an idea (Haas 1992); the requirement for action co-ordination in complex organisations (Goldstein and Keohane 1993). Thus, analysis of organisational culture, habits and routines displaces 'preferences' from individuals to bureaucratic collectivities but obscures the processes by which reasons are produced and decisions made (Finlayson 2004). If we are to understand the ways in which decisions may be reached on the grounds of valuational, affective and traditional, as well as instrumental rationalities then we have to find an approach capable of analysing the meanings of actions, objects and events for the actors making decisions involving them: we need some form of interpretivism.

From the Ideational to the Interpretive in British Political Studies

Bevir and Rhodes' *Interpreting British Governance* (2003) combines philosophical concepts of context, agency and tradition with research into the conduct of British governance in order to develop and apply concepts and methods grounded in a recognition of the fluid nature of political action in the era of the network. They justify their interpretive position on the basis that we can explain actions only by reference to 'the beliefs and preferences of the actor' but cannot 'read off people's beliefs and preferences from objective facts' about them such as their 'social class, institutional location, race and so forth' (Bevir and Rhodes 2003, 18–19). Eschewing the search for 'logical or structural processes' that determine events, such as the rationality of markets or path-dependency of institutions, they argue that 'governing practices can only be understood through the beliefs, and actions of individuals located in traditions and in response to dilemmas' (ibid., 198). Change in British governance, they argue, is the outcome of a 'series of contingent responses to dilemmas constructed in many ways'. Consequently, analysis is directed at the ways in which actors' traditions and beliefs cause them to construct situations in differing ways and to plot differing courses of action.

In clarifying the possibility of an objective though non-foundational knowledge of the history of ideas Bevir (1999) has sought not only to 'understand' but to 'explain' the history of ideas by interpreting agents' actions with reference to 'webs of belief' of which historical meanings are expressions (Bevir 1999, 176), building his account on a 'weak intentionality' in that the meanings with which he is concerned are those given to events and phenomena by individuals (ibid., 54). Changes in belief, he argues, can be explained in terms of rational attempts to maintain a consistent and coherent web of beliefs despite challenging dilemmas, an 'anthropological epistemology' that grounds objectivity in the everyday 'rules of

thumb' that govern debates and disputes between people and form normative standards for human communities (ibid., 101). Bevir thus constitutes a specific object of study: the beliefs held by individuals and the situated reasoning they employ when changing those beliefs as the result of a dilemma. This is the object of study brought forward by Bevir and Rhodes' interpretivism: the ideas of persons inhabiting reasonably determinate but not determining traditions on the basis of which they formulate defensible plans of action.

Three concepts are central to Bevir and Rhodes' interpretivism: narrative, tradition and dilemma. Narrative is understood to be an 'organising perspective', a map that explains (Bevir and Rhodes 2003, 26). It refers to the differing versions of British politics presented by political analysts (ibid., ch. 6) and to the way actors themselves explain their situation. They write that narrative 'signals the distinctive nature of explanation in the human sciences. Narratives explain human actions by references to the beliefs and preferences of the relevant individuals ... narratives encompass the maps, questions, languages and historical stories used to explain British government' (ibid., 26) and that 'we think of political practices or institutions as the contingent products of numerous actions inspired by competing narratives' (ibid., 38). Narrative is thus a mode of explanation, what we, the political analysts produce *and* something produced by political actors which we seek to explain.

Traditions are defined as 'inherited beliefs' and an 'initial influence on people that colours their actions only if their agency has not led them to change it' (ibid., 33). These traditions are 'contingent', produced only by the individuals that act on them, and we are cautioned against their reification or hypostatisation. Individuals creatively adapt traditions when faced with 'dilemmas', moments at which change is required because of contradictory beliefs. But we are also told that 'Political scientists construct traditions in ways appropriate to explaining the particular sets of beliefs and actions in which they are interested' (ibid., 33). Thus, tradition is something on which the political scientist draws in making an explanation and something which we will draw out as part of our explanation of political action.

Tradition and narrative thus appear to be a way of explaining things and the thing we are explaining. This is typical of hermeneutic methodologies. Bevir and Rhodes construe the activity of the interpretive political scientist as, ultimately, of the same sort as the activity of the political actor. Each is an individual thinking in a certain context, attempting to make coherent sense of how a developing world works. All are part of the endless 'hermeneutic circle'. Bevir and Rhodes thus reject the positivist self-image of the political scientist as somehow detached from the world that they study and examine the interaction of political scientists' research with the world of governance. In his work on New Labour, for instance, Bevir (2005) seeks to show how institutionalist ideas and theories about networks entered into the thinking of New Labour politicians who were reworking their social democratic tradition in the face of dilemmas caused by the crises of the welfare state and the challenges of the New Right. Just as scholars reflect on the world by drawing on the traditions that shape their thought, seeking reasonable ways in which to revise things in the light of new findings, so we can understand political actors. This, according to Bevir, demands a method of procedural (not 'ideological') individualism (Bevir 1999, 54, 192–193) that makes the thoughts, experiences and meanings

of individuals the central object of inquiry. Individual intellectual agency is therefore the object of study of interpretive political analysis: thinking that takes place within and on the basis of traditions as actors construct plausible stories that explain the world to themselves and their colleagues; narratives that they must rework as new ideas come to light, new findings are presented. Thus, for example, Bevir and Rhodes (2006, 109–126) closely study the activities of a Permanent Secretary and conduct interviews with police officers (*ibid.*, 145–163) in ethnographic studies designed to help the researchers examine how actors develop their beliefs in the shift to a new mode of open and networked ‘governance’. The ethnography makes available, as an object of study, the formation of individual beliefs out of the confrontation between situated actor and changing external world.

Colin Hay (2002, 258) has shown how ideas matter in politics because the world is too complex, the variables too many and the outcomes too uncertain, for actors to know for sure what they should do. Thus they seek ‘cognitive short cuts’, making choices deriving from intellectual paradigms in a ‘strategically selective’ context. This idea of ‘strategy’ is important. In politics one cannot simply choose the ‘best’ idea, or the one that is most coherent or congruent with our own traditions. One has to deal not only with the sorts of ‘dilemma’ identified by Bevir and Rhodes but also with contingency and uncertainty on at least two further levels: the uncertainty of the world, the need to act despite a lack of full and final information; and that caused by the (possibly competitive) presence of others who think in different ways, and perhaps think in different traditions. Both are intensified by ‘network governance’ (see Bevir and Rhodes’ (2006, 127–144) study of the NHS). If more and more parties or agencies have to be brought ‘on side’ in the formation or implementation of policy then policy will be more and more shaped by the need to win others’ assent to it (and in democracies ‘others’ can include the entire demos). Multiple ‘traditions’ are involved, they are not necessarily all congruent or commensurable and the likelihood of a single narrative explaining all things to all is decreased. It may be that not all parties perceive a ‘dilemma’ in the same way (or even perceive it at all), even that the nature and status of the parties is not agreed upon. We might say that the everyday ‘rules of thumb’ and normative standards that form the basis of Bevir’s ‘anthropological epistemology’ are exactly what become contested in the political arena. Politics is the place or moment where traditions and narratives can no longer be taken for granted, where the ‘web of belief’ is ruptured because rival traditions and narratives have clashed. Bevir and Rhodes’ conception of the reasoning individual thus under-appreciates the specificity of political ‘reasoning’ and the necessity of certain kinds of argumentation.

From Ideas to Arguments and From the Interpretive to the Rhetorical

The claim that political decision-making entails the application of reasoning in conditions of irreducible contingency chimes with the classical, Aristotelian, conception of political deliberation as concerned with the future advantage or harm of some course of action. Aristotle was well aware that in politics we have to come to decisions on the basis of claims that are at best probable rather than certain, to act when the grounds for acting are not as solid as we might like. But politics does not

face only this sort of 'empirical' uncertainty. It also has to contend with sometimes considerable contestation derived from the fact of social plurality: the existence of multiple and varied perspectives on the affairs of the polis, something Hannah Arendt saw as specific to the political domain of public action and speech.

Protagoras the sophist was condemned by Plato for the remark that 'Whatever each city judges to be just and fine, these things in fact are just and fine for it, so long as it holds these opinions' (*Theaetetus* 167c4–5), a doctrine held to be indicative of dangerous relativism. But when Protagoras famously declared that one can argue on both sides of a question, that some matters admit of good arguments for both sides, he may not have been advocating the cynical 'position-taking' of which sophists are accused but rather referring to a principle that is today enshrined in democratic parliaments: the inherent openness and contestability of political claims that can only be resolved by argument on all sides of the question (on Protagorean doctrines and their contested interpretation see Billig 1987; Farrar 1988; de Romilly 1992; Gagarin and Woodruff 1995). Similarly, Aristotle saw rhetoric as needed to make people see and understand the truth (and in that sense a secondary activity) but also because some matters do not yield to a single, indisputable truth (see also Sprute 1994) and the task before us is that of convincing others to see things in the same light as we, to define the situation in a particular way and to win others over to seeing it that way too (see Burnyeat 1994).

Democracies are premised on the recognition that people disagree not only about means but about ends and even about the meaning and value of means and ends. This contestability, intrinsic to democratic politics, concerns more than a simple clash of opinion: political disputes do not arise only out of misunderstanding or mistakes, nor simply from the absence of sufficient data, but because parties to a dispute emerge from different contexts with different criteria of assessment, including those that specify the presence of a problem or dilemma and those that specify the persons who legitimately engage with it. The field of political dispute is addressed to what we might call problems without solution inasmuch as they are dilemmas or uncertainties for which there is no agreed external evaluative standard; disputes that are not reducible to factual or epistemological problems because people disagree not only about a particular matter but about what that matter in fact is and about what a resolution might look like. Consider, for instance, political disputes about poverty and its relief. Such arguments do not only concern the best policy instrument for alleviating poverty but how poverty should be defined (and thus what would actually constitute its alleviation), whether or not poverty is a problem and if it is, then the kind of problem it might be (a moral, economic, social or security problem). Successful governance may require binding at least some of these different positions together, finding a way of approaching the matter and evaluating it, that can win the assent of all in order to then develop and implement a response to it.

Bevir and Rhodes conceive of rhetoric as essentially instrumental. A political actor has a belief and then presents it rhetorically. The analyst can then explain both the original belief and the other beliefs that led to it being shaped in a particular way for purposes of public communication (Bevir and Rhodes 2006, 23). The processes of forming of beliefs and the processes of forming public arguments about them are

kept separate and understood as two distinct actions. This is an underestimation of the extent to which argumentative rhetoric can be fully a part of the process of coming to believe something in the first place. To believe something is to accept the (many kinds of) reasons that can be presented for so believing it; to present and explain a belief to others is to present the arguments that are part and parcel of the belief. For instance, Bevir and Rhodes describe the charge that Tony Blair is 'presidential' as 'rhetorical', by which they mean that it is a way of 'expressing personal hostility to Blair' or a smokescreen for various attitudes about British governance (Bevir and Rhodes 2006, 104). This may well be so. But it is also a way of making sense of the Blairite approach to government and of sharing that way with others. The metaphor (similar to the critical description of US presidents in monarchical terms) is not a way of expressing hostility but a source of it, the way in which that hostility is understood and experienced.

Of course such a metaphorical presentation is contestable and contested. All such political judgement or decision-making involves 'undecidability': an uncertainty that is structural and determinate (see Laclau 1990; Derrida 1992 and 1998; Torfing 1999, 62–69). Logical, rational, geometric and analytical deductions can function perfectly well within the domains to which they apply, and in which the premises from which they proceed are accepted, already accounted for and justified. But sometimes, in some kinds of dispute, first principles clash. In 'realist' (Hobbesian) political analysis the clash of fundamental opinions is evidence of the 'anarchy' at the basis of all social relations and thus of the necessity of power, force and violence. And for rational choice theories it is a good reason to push all belief to one side in order to concentrate on the organisation of the 'game' of competing interests in such a way that the polity can be maintained. We are here proposing to dwell on this 'undecidability' and make it the object of political analysis, to examine and interpret politics in the light of it.

'Undecidability' derives from the fact that people understand different things by terms like 'freedom', 'choice', 'democracy' or, as we have seen, poverty; concepts whose meaning cannot be established independently of contestation, apart from the shifting historical and social contexts in which they are employed. Further, such structured indeterminacy inheres within the very rules on the basis of which one might derive a decision. Legal disputes, for instance, are resolved on the basis of prior fixed rules and instances of their application. But rival parties present these fixed rules in differing ways, each aiming to require a different decision to be taken as 'necessary'. The rules make possible the very situation in which they are contested and rearticulated and the contested nature of the rules is a condition of their existence. Similarly, in politics we clarify, institute and extend the rules of action as part of the very process of deciding and acting and we do so in a context of contestability where one is conscious of the varied opinions of others and of the need to be involved in appealing to them to change their view or to see it as usefully allied to one's own. In this sense the formation of a consensus or a unified constituency involves not the 'discovery' of a shared interest or opinion but its creation. This involves the provision of 'reasons' of all sorts: instrumental but also rational-legal, affective, valuational and traditional; the presentation of ways of conceiving of a phenomenon or an event as 'like this' rather than 'like that', of describing it in a particular way (see Torfing 1999, 68; Skinner 2002) so as to

motivate a particular action. In this respect the rhetorical approach has affinities with speech-act theory in that it concerns actions that seek to bring about particular outcomes (including other actions) through 'felicitous' speech. But where speech acts such as J. L. Austin's (1975) performatives are understood to depend for their success on their congruence with convention we are here drawing attention to the special importance of rhetorical political speech acts at those moments where convention is 'suspended' or 'called into question'. Rhetorical argument (which may involve all sorts of actions of the kind identified by speech-act theories such as affirming, reporting, admonishing, begging, warning, inviting, promising, congratulating and so forth) is part of the process by which concepts and intentions are created or maintained (see also Butler's (1993) discussion of illocutionary force and her development of the concept of performative).

Bevir and Rhodes are surely right to consider political actors as political theorists of a sort, as persons actively reflecting on, thinking and reasoning about the world with which they engage. But because the political actor must address not only their own 'tradition' but that of others with whom they must engage, a narrative may be employed as a partial way of explaining things to another as well as to oneself, reference to a tradition may be a more or less conscious strategy for justifying something (again to oneself as well as to others) and declaring something a dilemma a strategy for bringing about some kind of change (not a reflection or indication of it). If we begin with this conception of politics, as opposed to a conception of the reasoning individual, we are led to an object of study quite different to that advocated by Bevir and Rhodes, by institutionalists concerned with ideational preconditions embedded in procedural practices and routines or by analyses of the way institutions may affect or be affected by the mediated dissemination of ideas (Hall 1986 and 1992). If we begin with a clear and distinct concept of politics as the 'arena' within which we see expressed the irreducible and contested plurality of public life, the ineradicable contestation of differing world-views, then it is clear that what is distinct in politics is not the presence of beliefs but the presence of beliefs in contradiction with each other, not decisions about courses of action but of dispute over decisions and courses of action. It then follows that ideational and interpretive analyses have tended to examine the wrong object, which ought to be not ideas but arguments: their formation, effects and fate in the activity known as persuading. The study of such argument and persuasion necessitates the development of Rhetorical Political Analysis.

Studying Arguments

The study of political arguments, as they take place 'in the wild' is not well developed within political science (but see Riker 1986; Edmondson 1997; McLean 2001). Ethnomethodologists have examined linguistic strategies in political interviews (Bull 1994) and the 'tricks' by which a speaker can win applause (Atkinson 1984) but such studies are limited to micro-level interactions and pay minimal attention to the form and content of argumentation (see Billig 1991, 14–18). Critical discourse analysis generates interesting findings (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999; Fairclough 2000) but seems to presume political oratory to be merely a cover for dubious interests and is fixated on exposing evasions and omissions

rather than attending to argumentative content (relying on a larger theory of ideological distortion for which it cannot account). Habermasian assessments of deliberative procedures (e.g. Fox and Miller 1995; Risse 2004) are primarily normative and privilege particular ways of reasoning prior to analysis and evaluation. The revival of rhetoric in the social sciences in the 1980s generally emphasised the narratological and figurative aspects of knowledge production, sometimes as a critique of the imbrication of epistemology with power (see Nelson et al. 1991) or in order to sensitise practitioners to the importance of their own rhetorical address (Edmondson 1984; see also Brown 1977). British scholars of the history of political thought have made an immense contribution to interpretivism in the history of ideas through careful attention to the nuanced connections between context, language and intention, conceptualising political texts and statements as forms of action that can be explicated by being placed fully into the conventional linguistic context from which they derive and to which they also contribute (see Pocock 1972; Tully 1992; Skinner 2002; Palonen 2003; and from the US see Connolly 1974; Shapiro 1981 and 1984). Stuart Hall and others have shown how, through claims to tradition and on the basis of everyday culture, partial conceptions of the world come to appear universal, natural and incontestable (Hall et al. 1978; Hall 1980; Hall and Jacques 1983 and 1989) and 'decontestation' has since become central to a number of perspectives on the analysis of ideology that draw on the insights of deconstruction and psychoanalysis (see Norval 2000) and that understand the construction and dissemination of meaning as a form of political action and identity formation (see Howarth et al. 2000; Howarth and Torfing 2004). In common with other developing approaches (Carver and Hyvärinen 1997; ECPR 2002), these demonstrate that political argument is a distinct activity, a way of acting on others by acting on their conceptions.

To analyse and interpret political arguments we can make use of the insights of all these approaches. But they all take us into the orbit of the rhetorical tradition which has always been concerned with understanding persuasive, argumentative communication as a particular kind of public action; with the use of words to affect others in particular ways, so as to move them to act; with the nature of argument, reason giving and proving in complex, contingent and conflictual civic contexts (for surveys of the many works in this field see Lucaites et al. 1999; Bizzell and Herzberg 2001; Booth 2004). Rhetoric draws to our attention forms of argument and reasoning that exceed the strictures of the syllogism yet manifestly operate and function in real-world contexts of argument (Toulmin 1958; Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969); argumentative actions generated out of particular fields, shaped by the contingencies to which they are responses and the audiences to which they are addressed; 'first premises in use' (Hart 1997, 61), the ways in which fundamental principles and ideas are (re)formulated, expressed and then (re)developed in argumentative action. Rhetoricians have, of course, analysed political argumentation (e.g. McGee 1980 and 1982; Campbell and Jamieson 1990; Medhurst et al. 1990; Chilton 1996) but their approach has not yet been integrated into the concerns of political science. We require a Rhetorical Political Analysis (RPA) and in what follows I provide a general overview of the sorts of things it must be concerned with and do so as a way of demonstrating the kind of object under analysis and the conceptual tools one can use to examine it.

Rhetorical Political Analysis

If we wish systematically to investigate political rhetoric as a way of understanding and explaining political actions and events the first step must be to specify a corpus of argument for analysis: a single speech by a political actor or longer-term exchanges on some particular issue over a number of years expressed in a range of forms. These texts must then be located within their 'rhetorical situation' (Bitzer 1999 [1968]), the context of relations in which they took place. In parliamentary debate only certain people can speak, if chosen, and they speak according to procedural rules that function independently of the particular matter being discussed (which discussion will help to reaffirm those rules). In a public meeting other 'rules of engagement' apply and things are different again in select and cabinet committees, in pamphlets, briefing documents, white papers and so on. But these contextual conditions are not all-determining. Part of what a rhetorical act seeks to 'bring off' is an acceptance of certain roles, the adoption of particular positions *vis-à-vis* one another (such as teacher and pupil, expert and layman, leader and led). In this sense the most important thing the rhetorical situation concerns is the setting of the identity of participants. The success of this is, of course, not guaranteed. One of the characteristic features of politics in the advanced democracies is the central role of audiovisual media in collecting, disseminating (and interpreting) instances of political communication. One effect of this is to make the 'rhetorical situation' intrinsically ambiguous. A speech given to a room of party faithful may be recorded and extracts broadcast in any number of new contexts. This introduces uncertainty as to the relationship between parties (since it is not clear who in fact the speech is for) and this also creates uncertainty concerning the identities of parties involved in exchanges of political argument (and this may be one cause of the seeming gulf between the political 'class' and citizens in contemporary democracies). For these reasons analysis of rhetorical situations is an important concern for RPA.

Within the rhetorical situation an argument takes place. But what an argument concerns is not always clear. This is so at the level of both form (the type of argument) and content (the substantive subject under dispute). The point of a dispute, the 'bone of contention' is established by the act of arguing itself and the side that succeeds in fixing it secures great advantage. Roman rhetorical theory understood this through 'stasis theory' identifying four points of argument: if a thing is (conjecture), what a thing is (definition), what kind of thing it is (quality) and whether or not it is a thing we should be arguing about at all (place) (see Finlayson 2005). Arguments of conjecture concern facts. What is in dispute is whether or not something is the case, whether or not it happened. Arguments of definition centre on the names of things. They are attempts to define a thing in an advantageous way: for example, as borrowing rather than theft, as investment rather than spending. Arguments of quality concern the nature of an act. They seek to establish that a particular act should be judged as, for example, well-intentioned. For instance, when a political leader is accused of taking a country to war on the basis of false evidence we have a conjectural argument of accusation ('you lied') and refutation. If the political leader cannot successfully refute the charge he may shift the argument to one of definition, arguing that it was not a 'lie' but a

'judgement' of limited evidence, or to one of quality (a decision taken in good faith and for good, moral, reasons). He may even attempt an argument of place, suggesting that the question is no longer important or relevant and a distraction from more pressing concerns. Arguments of place are attempts to set the boundaries of political argument and may be particularly important since to rule certain issues off the agenda is to win before argument has begun. They are often associated with 'reactionary' arguments (of left or right) and take a number of forms. For instance, Albert Hirschman (1991) refers to the 'argument from jeopardy', F. M. Cornford (1933) names one of its manifestations the 'argument from unripe time', while for Bentham (1952 [1824]) they were 'fallacies from delay'.

In addition to the 'point of controversy' (the form) substantive content is also part of an argument. We might like to think that a paper produced by a Department for Education will be 'about' education or that a speech on foreign policy be 'about' foreign policy but things are not always so clear and we must examine how attention is directed to certain objects or phenomena and deflected from others; how certain things are emphasised and others de-emphasised (the giving of what Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) call 'presence'). We can do this by locating the subject in relation to the two axes of particular and universal. An educational policy document will be in a relationship with the particular policy domain of education and will take up a specific relationship to that domain's history. Certain aspects will be drawn to our attention, defined and redefined in particular ways. But such a document will also be in a relationship with the 'universal' context of all policy discourse, establishing (or disestablishing) connections between the particular and the universal domains, possibly in ways that imply the presence of something underlying otherwise discrete areas, something common to them. Thus, an education policy document concerned with skills and training may justify policy by reference to broader needs for enhanced economic productivity. As such the referent of the policy may be the 'labouring person' which it is seeking to improve by subjecting persons to particular policy instruments or processes.

Connections between particular and general policy domains are often forged by very general ethical presumptions that connect to deep-rooted political ideologies and ontologies. The point of much political argument, especially within the policy-forming process, is to make such connections possible, plausible and natural. However, contemporary conditions may make this ever harder yet ever more necessary as the network of governance comes to involve so many 'particular' interests (private providers, professional experts, consultants and policy entrepreneurs) that connections to the 'universal' domain become stretched thin, making policy harder to explain and legitimate to those who are not specialists.

These issues relate closely to the 'framing' of problems (see Rose and Miller 1992; Lakoff 2002). Phenomena can be problematised in different sorts of ways. We have already suggested that poverty may be understood as an economic problem or a moral one. It is a problem that may be understood to lie in the organisation of production or in the idleness and fecklessness of the poor themselves (or it may not be conceived as a problem at all). Often political arguments concern the posing of such problems in particular ways that specify particular things as the necessary

object of policy and lead to particular prescriptions. This can be a source of mutual incomprehension between rival positions but problem specification may also involve the creative redefining of a problem in order to redraw the constituencies concerned with it and extend the range of possible solutions.

Aristotle identified three genres of rhetoric: forensic, epideictic and deliberative, distinguishing between them on the basis of their differing objects, orientation to time and the role they ascribe to the audience. In epideictic or ceremonial rhetoric the objective is the praise or condemnation of someone or something. It is oriented to the present, to the current feelings of the audience and is often ritualistic, rehearsing common values, unifying and reaffirming perhaps through distinguishing 'us' from 'them' (Campbell and Jamieson 1990). Forensic or legal rhetoric is concerned with prosecution or defence, is focused on the past and aims to secure justice or injustice. As Aristotle argues, it tends to be concerned with demonstrating the motives (or absence of them) of a person, their character and thus the probability of their having acted in the way alleged. Deliberative, political rhetoric is concerned to exhort to, or deter from, a course of action, to show its potential advantage or harm. It is concerned with things that could happen and that we could make happen.

For RPA interest lies not only in the ways in which these genres work and the ways in which the relations between addresser, addressee and topic are defined (a question of the rhetorical situation) but in the characterisation of particular instances of rhetoric. Are these rhetorical genres observable? Do politicians seek to turn particular arguments into forensic or epideictic presentations rather than deliberative ones (or vice versa)? Does one kind tend to predominate in certain issues? This does not exhaust questions about genre which can be connected to some forms of institutionalism. Genre analysis concerns the ways in which an utterance is created by and adapted to a situation that is itself part of a history of previous speech acts. In analysing the more general generic features of political and policy discourse we may be able to observe such historically-shaped, institutionalised, forms of talk manifested as rhetorical style. Some of these stylistic features may be quite obvious, ritual moments, such as are found in a State of the Union address or a presidential inaugural (see Campbell and Jamieson 1990). But even the relatively hidden civil servant when authoring part of a green paper enters into a preset structure of communication that must (in order to be a green paper) satisfy certain conventions and that reflects institutional codes (see Iedema and Wodak 1999; Gunnarsson 2000; Fairclough 2001, 164). Thus RPA must identify the generic features of government policy documents such as introductory statements or forewords by ministers, executive summaries, particular kinds of sentence and syntax, the use of particular sorts of (usually impersonal) pronouns, numbered paragraphs and so on. It is on the basis of such stylistic features that such documents claim or manifest their authority, demarcating themselves from other kinds of text, for example an apparent lack of style, an absence of literary tropes or word play and an attempt at seeming clarity, that communicates a certain gravitas (see Fairclough 2001, 65–68). The more formal and unemotional a form of discourse the more we may think it objective and the more factual statements and normative claims become blurred, and description and prescription blended together. Government

documents such as green papers tend to use cumulative lists, statements, presentation of various examples, exemplars and role models as ways of building up a case.

A central aspect of rhetorical style is the arrangement of the narrative or 'statement of the facts'. Narrative is a fundamental way in which we grasp the meaning and the ordering of the events we experience and in particular of how we understand human actions and their effects (see for example Thompson's (1981) discussion of Ricoeur). The way in which we order facts, integrating them into a presentation of beginning, middle and end can be highly significant, 'naturalising' sequences of events, of causes and effects, imposing a generalised order. Unifying (and simplifying) events in this way narrative may also imply the presence of certain kinds of characters, events and agents, tacitly constructing a particular version of 'how we got here' and of where we are going. Indeed, the rhetoric of where we are going, of the implied end of a narrative sequence, can be very important (see for instance Claire Moon's (2006) analysis of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission). Narratives of many sorts can be found across policy documents, speeches and a range of political arguments. Specific political events may throw up very specific narratives (relating to individual conduct, particular policy decisions and so forth) but there are also broader and subtler narratives by which politicians explain how they, or their party, or the country, came to face a certain situation, demanding certain sorts of change or transformation. The rise of Thatcherism, for instance, involved a narrative of crisis (Hay 1996) to which she was the heroic response while that of Blairism involves the shift from 'old' to 'new' in a broader narrative of 'modernisation' of which New Labour is the protagonist (Finlayson 2003).

In rhetoric, 'commonplaces' are broadly applicable argumentative approaches that can be used across instances, standard kinds of proof that, for Cicero, included things such as definition, similarity, difference, contraries, cause, effect and comparison. They rely on everyday common-sense values of what is just or unjust, honourable or dishonourable, common maxims, generally approved of principles (see the discussion in Skinner 1996, 111–120) and commonly accepted ways of arguing. RPA is concerned both to identify what these are (the typical ways in which political actors present a case, the fixed appeals they tend to make) and to identify their usage. It may be the case that analysis will reveal that different groups of political actors work within particular frameworks of argument shaped by different sets of commonplace. The analysis of ideologies certainly suggests that different sets of commonplace are drawn on in liberal or conservative arguments (see Freedman 1998).

Commonplaces feed directly into the central concern of rhetorical strategy: the appeal. For the classical rhetoricians there were three primary modes of persuasive appeal: to ethos, to pathos and to logos. Appeals based on logos are those concerned to offer logical justifications. Where logic might employ the seemingly secure syllogistic form of reasoning, rhetoric employs enthymemes, 'quasi-logical' arguments that employ only some parts of a syllogism or rely on premises that are probable rather than certain. For instance, one party leader may claim that a rival cannot be trusted with rule because he has changed his position in a short space of time. The quasi-logical argument here is something like this: people who change

their minds often cannot be trusted, 'X' has changed their mind often and therefore cannot be trusted. This chain of reasoning rests on commonplace assumptions such as 'good leaders are those who are resolute and do not change their minds' or 'people with unchanging views can be relied upon'. Both of these claims have merit but it is not hard to imagine counter examples and counter commonplaces (such as 'bloody-minded people are arrogant and dangerous' or 'he who does not bend will break'). Enthymemes, then, rely on the activation (or deactivation) of certain commonplaces and, crucially, on the construction or validation of a premise from which further deductions can logically follow. Sometimes political dispute takes place within the framework of a commonplace proposition but it can take place between them and when it does the shape of political argument is quite different. It is the task of RPA to identify how commonplaces become accepted and employed in the reasoning processes of political actors and in the arguments they then employ with others.

The logical is only one class of argumentative appeal. Appeals to ethos rely on the character of the speaker, on their honesty, for instance, or their authority. This is what is invoked when someone claims expertise, formal qualifications or direct experience of a matter under discussion. Such appeals to the character of the addresser may be based on implicit claims to authority, or perhaps sympathy, and may be attempts to encourage an audience to identify with the speaker or to see them as 'just like us'. Certainly politicians try to engender a positive ethos and this is the main purpose of 'image management' and the effect by which we identify 'charisma'. It is also clear that political actors may seek to encourage 'affective rationality', to play on our emotions, moving us to anger, pity or fear and so on in order to provide the motivation for action. Indeed, some level of emotional involvement is probably central to any appeal that seeks to motivate others to act. It is unlikely that we will find all these appeals used to the same degree in all forms of rhetoric and so we need to identify where and when they are used. Are arguments within government likely to employ *logos*, because the basic framework of thought is shared and the premises can be relied on, or do they rely on ethos, the charisma of, or faith in, a leader? Are appeals to emotion more likely to be found in public political discourse or in political debates that are internal to certain sorts of political constituency?

We noted above that an important element of quasi-logical political rhetoric was the construction or legitimation of a premise. Such are also important in arguments from *pathos* or *ethos* and we may go so far as to say that the heart of rhetoric consists precisely in this creative process and that it depends above all on the use of images or 'figures'. Aristotle, for example, drew attention to the way in which one might seek to show that a particular virtue is in fact its opposite, how an act of courage could be made to look like recklessness or cowardice like wisdom, for rhetoric is greatly concerned with definitions or re-descriptions of terms, phenomena and actions (see Skinner 1996, ch. 4). Metaphors are a central aspect of this.

George Lakoff and Mark Johnson have shown that metaphors pervade everyday life, thought and action, declaring our 'ordinary conceptual system ... fundamentally metaphorical in nature' (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 3). When we describe someone as, say, a vulpine we take certain commonly associated characteristics of

the fox and blend them with our conception of a person so as to create a distinct image that emphasises certain features (of both a person and a fox), suppresses others and gives us a distinct way of grasping someone. Metaphors, then, involve 'co-present thoughts', a 'borrowing between and intercourse of thoughts' that opens up new considerations, causing terms to interact such that certain features are drawn out and emphasised, 'organising' our conceptions (Richards 1936, 94; see also Black 1962). Metaphor making is thus conceptually creative, enabling us to perceive things in new and different ways, forging conceptual connections. Donald Schon, with regard to social policy, speaks of 'generative metaphors' that frame and reframe the objects and purposes of policy (Schon 1979, 255). Political talk certainly abounds with metaphors such as 'the body politic', the 'nanny state' or 'axis of evil' and invented terms that bring one concept into relation with another to make both appear in a new light, 'social capital' and 'knowledge economy' for instance (see Beer and Landtsheer 2004; Charteris-Black 2005). These make new conceptions available from which chains of reasoning may be derived. Some metaphors lie quite deep, organising our thoughts and shaping our arguments as we formulate them. This is particularly true of metaphors that contribute to a spatial organisation of politics, 'left' and 'right' for instance or moving 'forward not back'.

Figures are central to the indicative presentation of particular phenomena or events, to 'showing' things as being 'like this' or 'like that' and making one stick, succeeding in a 'definition of the situation', in the establishment of the premises from which deductions will be made, represents a considerable political victory. As William Connolly has argued, 'the language of politics is not a neutral mechanism that conveys ideas independently formed; it is a ... structure of meanings that channels political thought and action in certain directions' (Connolly 1974, 1).

These are some of the questions asked, and areas examined, by a putative Rhetorical Political Analysis. To be sure analysis of narratives, metaphors and so forth in political speech is not new (it begins alongside political theory and political analysis). But RPA insists on perceiving these phenomena within argumentative contexts, within processes of trying to bind together varied elements of a governance network (or exclude others) and thus not merely as fictive foundations to be critically exposed as devious political machinations. On the contrary, such argumentative practices are the very stuff of democratic politics wherein beliefs, thoughts, ideas and concepts (however sincerely held) are always turned into arguments, into elements of contestable propositions, the shape of which is in part defined by the historical development and deployment of these arguments which, if they are to survive, must win adherents in a contest of persuasive presentation. RPA analyses these not so as to expose or criticise them (though it may) but in order to contribute to their better understanding and more positive valuation, to ensure not less argumentation but more and better.

Conclusion: From Ideas to Arguments

We began with rational choice theory, before passing through ideational institutionalism and new interpretivism and throughout our concern has always been with actions and decisions. Political decision-making takes place in a contested and

uncertain context that necessarily contains numerous competing options. Thus we are faced with numerous arguments which, we have proposed, are actions themselves and not merely comments upon actions and thus something that political analysis must necessarily consider. Thus, in contrast to RCT, institutionalist ideational analysis and Bevir and Rhodes' interpretivism, RPA foregrounds the inter-subjective, dynamic, formation and reformation of arguments and the elements of which they are composed. It observes the dissemination of concepts, words and ideas showing how they pass through institutions, getting promoted, destroyed, redefined and redeployed; examines 'genealogies' of the way in which 'common sense' is constituted and altered and identifies replicated patterns of political argument. It presumes that arguments are formulated and enacted on the basis of prior institutionalised systems of meaning that exert pressure on actors, yet it also draws attention to political action as a distinct kind of creative, intellectual and pragmatic activity. RPA broadens our horizons as to the 'rationalities' on which politics is based, extending them into areas that involve the affective, the traditional, the figurative and the poetic and which require us to examine the multiple influences on styles and strategies of political argument. The purpose of the present work has been to show that if we neglect arguments or try to reduce them to something else then we fail to consider something that is absolutely definitive of politics. That is why we need Rhetorical Political Analysis.

About the Author

Alan Finlayson, Department of Politics and International Relations, Swansea University, Singleton Park, Swansea SA2 8PP, UK, email: A.Finlayson@swan.ac.uk

Bibliography

- Atkinson, M. (1984) *Our Masters' Voices: The Language and Body Language of Politics* (London: Methuen).
- Austin, J. L. (1975) *How to Do Things with Words* (London: Oxford University Press).
- Bang, H. (ed.) (2003) *Governance as Social and Political Communication* (Manchester: Manchester University Press).
- Barker, R. (2000) 'Hooks and hands, interests and enemies: Political thinking as political action', *Political Studies*, 48:2, 223–238.
- Beer, F. A. and Landsheer, C. de (eds) (2004) *Metaphorical World Politics* (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press).
- Bentham, J. (1952 [1824]) *The Handbook of Political Fallacies* (New York: Harper and Brothers).
- Bevir, M. (1999) *The Logic of the History of Ideas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Bevir, M. (2005) *New Labour: A Critique* (London: Routledge).
- Bevir, M. and Rhodes, R. A. W. (2003) *Interpreting British Governance* (London: Routledge).
- Bevir, M. and Rhodes, R. A. W. (2006) *Governance Stories* (London: Routledge).
- Billig, M. (1987) *Arguing and Thinking: A Rhetorical Approach to Social Psychology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Billig, M. (1991) *Ideology and Opinions* (London: Sage).
- Bitzer, L. (1999 [1968]) 'The rhetorical situation', reprinted in J. L. Lucaites, C. M. Condit and S. Caudhill (eds), *Contemporary Rhetorical Theory* (London: Guilford Press), 217–226.
- Bizzell, P. and Herzberg B. (eds) (2001) *The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the Present* (Boston, MA: Bedford/St Martin's).

- Black, M. (1962) *Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).
- Blyth, M. (1997) '“Any more bright ideas”: The ideational turn in comparative political economy', *Comparative Politics*, 29:2, 229–250.
- Blyth, M. (2002) 'Institutions and ideas', in D. Marsh and G. Stoker (eds), *Theory and Methods in Political Science* (Basingstoke: Palgrave), 292–310.
- Booth, W. (2004) *The Rhetoric of Rhetoric* (Oxford: Blackwell).
- Boudon, R. (1998) 'Limitations of rational choice theory', *The American Journal of Sociology*, 104:3, 817–828.
- Brown, R. H. (1977) *A Poetic for Sociology: Toward a Logic of Discovery for the Human Sciences* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Bull, P. (1994) 'On identifying questions, replies and non-replies in political interviews', *Journal of Language and Social Psychology*, 13:2, 115–131.
- Burnyeat, M. (1994) 'Enthymeme: The logic of persuasion', in D. J. Furley and A. Nehemas (eds), *Aristotle's Rhetoric: Philosophical Essays* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), 3–55.
- Butler, J. (1993) *Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of 'Sex'* (London: Routledge).
- Campbell, K. K. and Jamieson K. H. (1990) *Deeds Done in Words: Presidential Rhetoric and the Genres of Governance* (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press).
- Carver, T. and Hyvärinen, M. (eds) (1997) *Interpreting the Political: New Methodologies* (London: Routledge).
- Charteris-Black, J. (2005) *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor* (Basingstoke: Palgrave).
- Chilton, P. (1996) *Security Metaphors: Cold War Discourse from Containment to Common European Home* (Oxford: Peter Lang).
- Chouliaraki, L. and Fairclough, N. (1999) *Discourse in Late Modernity: Rethinking Critical Discourse Analysis* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press).
- Connolly, W. (1974) *The Terms of Political Discourse* (Lexington, KY: Heath).
- Cornford, F. M. (1933) *Microcosmographia Academica: Being a Guide for the Young Academic Politician* (Cambridge: Bowes & Bowes).
- Derrida, J. (1992) 'Force of law: The mystical foundation of authority', in D. Cornell, M. Rosenfeld and D. G. Carlson (eds), *Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice* (London: Routledge), 3–67.
- Derrida, J. (1998) *Limited Inc.* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press).
- Easton, D. (1953) *The Political System: An Inquiry Into the State of Political Science* (New York: Knopf).
- ECPR (2002) 'Symposium: Discourse analysis and political science', *European Political Science*, 2:1.
- Edmondson, R. (1984) *Rhetoric in Sociology* (Basingstoke: Macmillan).
- Edmondson, R. (ed.) (1997) *The Political Context of Collective Action: Power, Argumentation and Democracy* (London: Routledge).
- Fairclough, N. (2000) *New Labour, New Language?* (London: Routledge).
- Fairclough, N. (2001) *Language and Power* (Harlow: Longman).
- Farrar, C. (1988) *The Origins of Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Finlayson, A. (2003) *Making Sense of New Labour* (London: Lawrence and Wishart).
- Finlayson, A. (2004) 'Political science, political ideas and rhetoric', *Economy and Society*, 33:4, 528–549.
- Finlayson, A. (2005) 'How to make the argument for Europe', *Renewal*, 13:1, 76–84.
- Fischer, F. (2003) *Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Fox, C. J. and Miller, H. T. (1995) *Postmodern Public Administration: Toward Discourse* (London: Sage).
- Freedon, M. (1998) *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach* (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
- Gagarin, M. and Woodruff P. (1995) *Early Greek Political Thought from Homer to the Sophists* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Goldstein, J. and Keohane, R. O. (1993) *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs Institutions and Political Change* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).
- Gunnarsson, B.-L. (2000) 'Discourse Organizations and National Cultures', *Discourse and Society*, 2:1, 5–33.
- Haas, P. (1992) 'Introduction: Epistemic communities and international policy coordination', *International Organization*, 46:1, 1–36.

- Hall, P. (ed.) (1986) *Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Hall, P. (1992) 'The movement from Keynesianism to monetarism: Institutional analysis and British economic policy in the 1970s', in S. Steinmo, K. Thelen and F. Longstreth (eds), *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 90–113.
- Hall, S. (1980) *Culture, Media, Language: Working Papers in Cultural Studies, 1972–1979* (London: Hutchinson in Association with the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies).
- Hall, S. and Jacques, M. (1983) *The Politics of Thatcherism* (London: Lawrence and Wishart).
- Hall, S. and Jacques, M. (1989) *New Times: The Changing Face of Politics in the 1990s* (London: Lawrence and Wishart).
- Hall S., Critcher, C., Jefferson, T., Clarke, J. and Robert, B. (1978) *Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order* (London: Macmillan).
- Hart, R. P. (1997) *Modern Rhetorical Criticism* (Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon).
- Hay, C. (1996) 'Narrating crisis: The discursive construction of the "Winter of Discontent"', *Sociology*, 30:2, 253–277.
- Hay, C. (2002) *Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction* (Basingstoke: Palgrave).
- Hindess, B. (1988) *Choice, Rationality and Social Theory* (London: Unwin Hyman).
- Hirschman, A. O. (1991) *The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy* (Harvard: Belknap Press).
- Howarth, D. and Torfing, J. (eds) (2004) *Discourse Theory in European Politics: Identity, Policy and Governance* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Howarth, D., Norval, A. J. and Stavrakakis, Y. (eds) (2000) *Discourse Theory and Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change* (Manchester: Manchester University Press).
- Iedema, R. and Wodak, R. (1999) 'Introduction: Organisational discourses and practices', *Discourse and Society*, 10:1, 5–19.
- Krasner, S. (1993) 'Westphalia and all that', in J. Goldstein and R. O. Keohane (eds), *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs Institutions and Political Change* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press), 235–264.
- Laclau, E. (1990) *New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time* (London: Verso).
- Lakoff, G. (2002) *Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press).
- Lakoff, G. and Johnson M. (1980) *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press).
- Lowndes, V. (2002) 'Institutionalism', in D. Marsh and G. Stoker (eds), *Theory and Methods in Political Science* (Basingstoke: Palgrave), 90–108.
- Lucaites, J. L., Condit, C. M. and Caudhill, S. (eds) (1999) *Contemporary Rhetorical Theory* (New York: Guilford Press).
- March, J. G. and Olsen, J. P. (1984) 'The new institutionalism: Organizational factors in political life', *American Political Science Review*, 78:3, 734–749.
- Marsh, D. and Savigny, H. (2004) 'Political science as a broad church: The search for a pluralist discipline', *Politics*, 24:3, 155–168.
- Mayntz, R. (2003) 'New challenges to governance theory', in H. Bang (ed.), *Governance as Social and Political Communication* (Manchester: Manchester University Press), 27–40.
- McGee, M. (1980) 'The "Ideograph": A link between rhetoric and ideology', *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 66:1, 1–16.
- McGee, M. (1982) 'A materialist's conception of rhetoric', in R. E. McKerrow (ed.), *Explorations in Rhetoric: Studies in Honor of Douglas Ehninger* (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman), 23–48.
- McLean, I. (2001) *Rational Choice and British Politics: An Analysis of Rhetoric and Manipulation from Peel to Blair* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Medhurst, M. J., Ivie, R. L., Wander, P. and Scott, R. L. (1990) *Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor and Ideology* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press).
- Moon, C. (2006) 'Narrating political reconciliation: Truth and reconciliation in South Africa', *Social and Legal Studies*, 15:2, 257–275.
- Nelson, J. S., Megill, A. and McCloskey, D. (eds) (1991) *The Rhetoric of the Human Sciences: Language and Argument in Scholarship and Public Affairs* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press).
- Norval, A. (2000) 'Review article: The things we do with words: Contemporary approaches to the analysis of ideology', *British Journal of Political Science*, 30:2, 313–346.

- Palonen, K. (2003) *Quentin Skinner: History, Politics, Rhetoric* (Cambridge: Polity).
- Perelman, C. and Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1969) *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation* (London: University of Notre Dame Press).
- Pierre, J. (ed.) (2000) *Debating Governance: Authority, Steering and Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Pocock, J. G. A. (1972) *Politics, Language and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History* (London: Methuen).
- Rhodes, R. A. W. (1997) *Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability* (Buckingham: Open University Press).
- Richards, I. A. (1936) *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Riker, W. H. (1986) *The Art of Political Manipulation* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press).
- Risse, T. (2004) 'Global governance and communicative action', *Government and Opposition*, 39:2, 288–313.
- Romilly, J. de (1992) *The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens* (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
- Rose, N. and Miller, P. (1992) 'Political power beyond the state: Problematics of government', *British Journal of Sociology*, 43:2, 173–205.
- Schon, D. A. (1979) 'Generative metaphor: A perspective on problem-setting in social policy', in A. Ortony (ed.), *Metaphor and Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 254–283.
- Shapiro, M. J. (1981) *Language and Political Understanding: The Politics of Discursive Practices* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press).
- Shapiro, M. J. (ed.) (1984) *Language and Politics* (Oxford: Macmillan).
- Skinner, Q. (1996) *Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Skinner, Q. (2002) *Visions of Politics: Vol. 1, Regarding Method* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Sprute, J. (1994) 'Aristotle and the legitimacy of rhetoric', in D. J. Furley and A. Nehemas (eds), *Aristotle's Rhetoric: Philosophical Essays* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), 117–128.
- Stoker, G. (1998) 'Governance as theory: Five propositions', *International Social Science Journal*, 50:155, 17–27.
- Thompson, J. B. (1981) *Critical Hermeneutics: A Study in the Thought of Paul Ricoeur and Jurgen Habermas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Torfing, J. (1999) *New Theories of Discourse: Laclau, Mouffe and Zizek* (Oxford: Blackwell).
- Toulmin, S. (1958) *The Uses of Argument* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Tully, J. (ed.) (1992) *Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).

Copyright of British Journal of Politics & International Relations is the property of Blackwell Publishing Limited and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.